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Abstract This article provides an analysis of the phenomenology of affectivity underlying 
the work of Edith Stein. Taking as point of departure two of her works, The 
problem of Empathy (1917) and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
(1922), the paper focuses on the idea that emotions fulfil a cognitive function: 
they make us accessible the realm of values. The argument of the paper is 
developed in two sections. The first section offers an overview of Stein’s main 
theses about emotions, feelings, moods and sentiments and places them within 
the larger framework of the early phenomenological accounts on affectivity. 
The second section examines the claim that emotions are responsible for 
grasping values concentrating on two facets of this thesis: the first regards the 
epistemological question according to which values are grasped by affective 
phenomena, while the second regards the ontological question about the nature 
of these grasped values.
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Abstract This article provides an analysis of the phenomenology of affectivity 
underlying the work of Edith Stein. Taking as point of departure two of her works, 
The problem of Empathy (1917) and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
(1922), the paper focuses on the idea that emotions fulfil a cognitive function: they 
make us accessible the realm of values. The argument of the paper is developed in 
two sections. The first section offers an overview of Stein’s main theses about emo-
tions, feelings, moods and sentiments and places them within the larger framework 
of the early phenomenological accounts on affectivity. The second section examines 
the claim that emotions are responsible for grasping values concentrating on two 
facets of this thesis: the first regards the epistemological question according to 
which values are grasped by affective phenomena, while the second regards the 
ontological question about the nature of these grasped values.
1  The Scope of Edith Stein’s Philosophical Thought
In recent decades, philosophers working on the problem of other minds have shown 
increasing interest in Edith Stein’s work on the nature of empathy. This interest 
should be welcomed for various reasons. First of all, the study of Stein’s work on 
empathy has contributed to the recovery of an often neglected period of the phe-
nomenological movement known as “early phenomenology,” which was led by the 
first disciples of Husserl and Pfänder and includes authors such as Reinach, Conrad- 
Martius, Scheler, Geiger, and Walther—to mention but a few.1 Moreover, the study 
of Stein’s claims about social cognition has led to a perception of her as an original 
thinker who gave new impulses to Husserl’s phenomenology, leaving behind an 
image of a faithful assistant and the occasional accusation that she contributed to 
discrediting phenomenology among social scientists.2 As the study of her theory of 
1 Cf. for an overview on this movement: Moran and Parker 2015.
2 This accusation was formulated by Schutz: Schutz 1972, 140–141.
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empathy shows, she offered a phenomenological alternative for explaining this phe-
nomenon whose relevance is still alive in the contemporary debate on other minds.3 
Last but not least, this recent attention has also contributed to making the analysis 
offered by other female phenomenologists—such as Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Else 
Voigtländer, and Gerda Walther—on similar topics, which have until now been 
eclipsed by the works of their male colleagues, more visible.4
While we should support this new interest in Stein’s social ontology and recog-
nise the importance of empathy as a key concept in her philosophical thought, we 
should also observe that her contribution to the perennial themes of philosophy can-
not be reduced to this topic. This revival of Stein’s philosophy of empathy—accord-
ing to my diagnosis—has not been accompanied by a sufficiently accurate study of 
other aspects of her work. Her philosophical legacy should be revised by contextu-
alizing her claims in a broader framework, which comprises a philosophy of reli-
gion, a metaphysics, a theory of the foundation of science, a philosophy of mind, 
and an investigation of human nature.5 The present paper is conceived against this 
background and aims to analyze a crucial concept in Stein’s understanding of human 
affectivity. Taking as point of departure two main sources—The Problem of Empathy 
(1917) and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (1922) (the latter contain-
ing two treatises “Sentient Causality” and “Individual and Community”)—my goal 
is to shed light on the Steinian idea of the intentionality of feelings and investigate 
the relationship between emotion and value.6 Focusing on this topic, I hope to show, 
on the one hand, how Stein’s work is placed in the larger context of the Brentanian 
tradition, how she develops her claims in lively exchange with other members of the 
early phenomenological group, and how she contributes in an original way to the 
development of a phenomenology of affectivity. On the other hand, I also aim to 
present her claims in a way that is fruitful for the contemporary meta-ethical debate 
on feelings, emotions, and values. It is my conviction that Stein’s ideas are as much 
of a challenge today as they were in the time they were formulated, so that her work 
can offer new insights in current discussions about human affectivity.
This paper is structured in two main sections. The first is devoted to Stein’s 
model of affectivity. Attention will be paid to feeling sensations, general feelings, 
emotions, moods and sentiments. Following the new paradigm of the affective life 
inaugurated by Brentano and then refined by his disciples, Stein considers emotions 
not as mere subjective bodily feelings. Rather, he takes them to be intentional phe-
nomena that both are directed towards an object, and reveal to us what is valuable. 
A similar view on the emotions as “feeling towards” has been developed in current 
philosophy within the paradigm of “affective intentionality”.7 The second section 
analyzes two facets of the claim that emotions are intentional states responsible for 
3 Cf. Zahavi 2014 and Szanto and Moran 2015.
4 For an overview: Wobbe 1997 and Vendrell Ferran 2008
5 Some recent works on Stein are imbued precisely with this spirit: Calcagno 2007 and Lebech 
2009.
6 Cf. for a general overview on Stein’s theory of the emotions: Vendrell Ferran 2015.








































disclosing values: the epistemological question about how values are grasped and 
the ontological question about the nature of these values. I will argue that, while 
Stein follows Husserl’s “a priori of correlation” between intentional objects (noema) 
and the modes in which they are manifested in consciousness (noesis), she develops 
correlational research that allows her to defend a singular version of axiological 
realism.
2  The Intentional Structure of Affectivity: Intricacies 
and Varieties
2.1  The Intentionality of Affective Phenomena 
in the Brentanian Tradition
This section examines the intricacies and varieties of the intentional structure of 
affectivity in Stein’s model of the mind. I begin embedding her work in the 
Brentanian tradition of intentionality, and then in Sect. 2.2 I focus in on her model 
of affectivity and especially her theory of emotions.8
As is well known, with the publication of Psychologie vom empirischen 
Standpunkt (1874) Brentano re-introduced the idea of an intentional reference or 
intentional in-existence. As he famously states at this time, each mental phenome-
non includes something as object within itself.9 His theory distinguishes three main 
forms of intentional reference or “intentional acts”: in presentations something is 
presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, and in love and hate some-
thing is loved or hated (Brentano 2015: 92–93). This third form concerns the broader 
class of affective phenomena which, according Brentano’s innovative view, are 
forms of being related to an object. Brentano’s theory of affectivity rests upon three 
main pillars, which will be object of scrutiny, criticism, and further development by 
the members of his school.10
 1) The broad extension of “love and hate”: According to the first pillar of Brentano’s 
theory, the class of “love and hate” should be broadly conceived so that it com-
prehends a wide variety of phenomena such as feelings, emotions, desires, inten-
tions, and acts of the will. Brentano gives three arguments in favor of this claim:
8 Cf. For the complexities of the concept of intentionality: Drummond 2003, 65; Searle 2012, 9–22; 
and Salice 2012, 24.
9 Notice that Brentano has an immanentistic account of intentionality according to which the object 
is included in the mental phenomenon itself. Therefore, his view differs substantially from later 
developments of the concept of intentionality which emphasize the idea that mental phenomena 
are transparent to the world and give us information about it. This difference between Brentano’s 
account and recent account of intentionality has been pointed out by Barry Smith (Smith 1994: 
42).
10 Cf. for an account of the shared claims between Brentano and Husserl: Drummond 2003, 84 and 
Drummond 2013, 52.






























 (a) First, he takes the differences among all these phenomena to be only a mat-
ter of degree: a gradual transition from one phenomenon of this class to the 
next is possible. That is, between the feelings of pleasure and pain, on the 
one hand, and the acts of the will, on the other, there are many transitional 
phenomena. As he puts it: “Consider the following series, for example: sad-
ness – yearning for the absent good – hope that it will be ours – the desire to 
bring it about – the courage to make the attempt – the decision to act. The 
one extreme is a feeling, the other an act of the will; and they may seem to 
be quite remote from one another. But if we attend to the intermediate mem-
bers and compare only the adjacent ones we find the closest connections and 
almost imperceptible transitions throughout” (Brentano 2015: 245–246). To 
describe this transition Brentano speaks of a “germ” of the striving con-
tained within the yearning. The germ “germinates” when one hopes and 
“blooms” when one thinks of possibly doing something, has the courage to 
do so, and finally comes to a decision. With this claim, Brentano is overem-
phasizing the link between emotions and inclinations to act.
 (b) Second, all the phenomena of this class reveal an acceptance or rejection of 
their objects. Analogously to the case of judgments, there is an affirmation 
or denial of a fact in the case of the emotions, since the content can be agree-
able as something good or disagreeable as something bad. The phenomena 
of this class are “concerned with an object’s value or lack thereof” (Brentano 
2015: 248). When we desire something, this something has a value for us; 
when something makes us happy, we love it and we desire its existence.
 (c) Finally, all the phenomena of this class share the same intentional structure, 
i.e. the same reference to their objects, which cannot be reduced to the struc-
ture of perception or judgment. This reference consists in the opposition 
between accepting (loving) or rejecting (hating) an object (he distinguishes 
between joy and sorrow, desire and aversion, striving for and striving against, 
willing and not willing). These appear with different degrees of intensity, in 
being morally good or wrong, and in being subjected to the laws of ethics 
(opposition, intensity, perfection, laws).
 2) Cognitive dependence: In Brentano’s view, each mental act is a presentation or 
is grounded in a presentation. This is true for judgments, as well as for the third 
class of affective phenomena. The immediate consequence of this claim is that 
all affective phenomena depend upon presentations or judgments. With this 
claim, Brentano is defending a “cognitive theory of the emotions”. Cognitivism 
of the emotions exists in different versions, but the one defended by Brentano 
consists in making feelings, emotions, desires, and acts of the will depend upon 
presentations (such as perceptions and imaginings) and judgments (such as 
beliefs, suppositions, etc.). The function of these cognitions consists in giving us 
the object towards which the affective act is directed. To fear something or desire 














































 3) Fitting Attitude Theory of Value. As mentioned above, the phenomena of love 
and hate are concerned with the value of their objects. The third pillar of 
Brentano’s theory which gives an account of what is valuable was further devel-
oped in The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong (Vom Ursprung sittli-
cher Erkenntnis 1889). In this lecture his aim is to break with the “subjective 
view of ethics” (Brentano 2009: X). To be valuable is to be the object of an 
appropriate phenomenon of the third class, i.e. values should be understood in 
terms of appropriate evaluative attitudes. In support of his claim, he focusses on 
the analogy between judgments and emotions. This analogy is based on the fol-
lowing tenants. First, the objects of both judgments and emotions are both the 
object of a presentation and, at the same time, of a pro or contra attitude. In the 
case of judgment, there is an opposition between affirmation or acceptance, on 
the one hand, and denial or rejection, on the other. In the case of the emotions 
there is an opposition between love and hate, inclination and disinclination, and 
being pleased and being displeased. Second, judgments and emotions may be 
correct or incorrect. A thing is true when the affirmation relating to it is correct, 
and a thing is good “when the love relating to it is correct” (Brentano 2009: 18). 
According to Brentano “the good is that which is worthy of love, that which can 
be loved with a love that is correct” (Ibid). Something is valuable when it elicits 
love as something that is lovable. The phenomena of the third class, thus, have 
appropriate objects. Finally, Brentan holds that human beings have a natural 
tendency to prefer goodness over badness. We tend to want to avoid error, to 
prefer the truth, and, in the same sense, to prefer the good over the bad. However, 
as he recognizes, this analogy is imperfect. In his words: “Everything that is true 
is equally true; but not everything that is good is equally good” (Brentano 2009: 
26). In logic we distinguish between truth and error; but in ethics, what is good 
appears in degrees: something may be good but it is possible that there is some-
thing better.
Regarding the later developments of this idea via the members of the Brentano 
School, three important consequences of Brentano’s view should be mentioned 
here. First, Brentano’s position is known as the “fitting attitude theory of values” 
and has to be distinguished from “robust value realism”. For value realism values 
exist independently of the possible reactions they may elicit in feeling subjects; for 
Brentano, on the contrary, values are related to the possible reactions of feeling 
subjects. Second, in this text, the correctness of the emotions is interpreted in terms 
of “appropriateness” and “fittingness” between them and objective entities which 
function as their correlates.11 Finally, Brentano distances himself from those  theories 
11 Cf. For an insightful interpretation of Brentano’s concept of the correctness of judgments: see 
Moran 2000: 31. As Moran points out, during the same year as this lecture, Brentano also gave the 
lecture “On the Concept of Truth”. If we follow the latter, the concept of correctness in the case of 
the judgments should not be interpreted as a correspondence between mind and world, but rather 
as an assertion of something based on evidence. The correlates of judgments are thus objective 
entities. Judgments assert “states of affairs” as existent. To understand this concept of truth, the 
notion of “evidence” is crucial. Truth is not understood as a correspondence between mind and the 






































according to which emotions grasp values. Explicitly in the 1924 edition of his 
Psychology from an empirical Standpoint, he claims: “I do not believe that anyone 
will understand me to mean that phenomena belonging to this class are cognitive 
acts by which we perceive the goodness or badness, value or disvalue of certain 
objects” (Brentano 2015: 247). He makes clear that he separates the class of the 
emotions from the class of the judgments, and furthermore he does not assume that 
the phenomena of the third class presuppose presentations of the good and the bad, 
or value and disvalue.
Brentano’s students in their respective works examined and refined these three 
claims on the intentionality of the affective life and introduced serious modifica-
tions. These changes constitute the framework in which Stein built her own model. 
Here I will mention only those refinements that were influential on Stein’s work.
 1) Affective and conative phenomena. Despite the general acceptance that the con-
cept of intentionality found among Brentano’s pupils, they modified his first 
claim concerning the unity of the phenomena of “love and hate,” introducing a 
distinction between “affective phenomena” such as feelings and emotions, on 
the one hand, and “conative phenomena” such as desires and volitions, on the 
other. The main argument for this distinction is that while conative acts tend to a 
fulfillment of their goals, this tendency is not inherent for the affective ones 
(Stumpf 1928, 28; Meinong 1968, 39).
 2) Feeling sensations and intentional feelings. The second modification concerns 
Brentano’s claim that intentionality is—to put it in current terminology—the 
“mark of the mental” (Crane 1998). Most of his students thought that there are 
mental phenomena that do not show this feature. Specifically for the phenomena 
of the third class, we should distinguish—as Stumpf, Husserl, and Scheler did—
between “intentional feelings” and “feeling sensations” (Husserl 1992, 383; 
Stumpf 1928, 116; Scheler 1973a: 328). While intentional feelings are directed 
towards objects and resemble perceptions and judgments, feeling sensations 
(such as pleasure and pain) may be directed towards the object that is the cause 
of the sensations, but they are not intrinsically related to them. Further, only 
emotions have a founded nature, but not bodily feelings, which do not require 
cognitions in order to take place.
 3) Multiplicity of value theories. Despite accepting a general relationship between 
the feeling subjects and values, the concrete understanding of this relationship 
was understood by each one of his students in a different way. Some of them, 
such as Meinong in his first value theory or Ehrenfels in the sphere of ethics, 
defend a clear-cut value emotivism according to which values are projections of 
world, but as “fittingness” or “appropriatness” or form of “harmony” between the thing as it 
appears and the manner of judging about it. In “On the Concept of Truth”, Brentano also refers to 
the class of the emotions by comparing their correctness with the correctness of the judgments. 
Drawing on Moran’s interpretation of the Brentanian account of judgments and truth in 1889, and 
applying a similar interpretation to the case of the emotions, we can say that Brentano argues in 







































our emotions or desires. Others, like Scheler or the late Meinong, will move 
towards value realism and advocate for different versions of it.12
Stein’s model of affectivity can only be fully understood in this larger phenom-
enological context, which takes Brentano’s thought as point of departure and refor-
mulates each of the pillars of his theory of the intentionality of the emotions.
2.2  Stein’s Model of Affectivity
The criticisms developed by Brentano’s students motivate two questions about the 
intentionality of affective phenomena: Are all affective phenomena intentional? 
And, in case they show the feature of intentionality: Are all of them intentional in 
the same way? The idea that in the affective realm intentionality cannot always be 
interpreted in the same way seems plausible. It is possible that the general experi-
ence of being directed towards an object may adopt different forms depending on 
which affective phenomenon is taking place. Stein’s work offers us a way to analyze 
precisely this case. She offers a very accurate account of how to understand the 
“intentionality” of different affective phenomena. The model that I present here, 
however, is an abstraction of her thought. For Stein, experiences always have a two- 
fold structure: as my experience and as a shared experience with others (Lebech 
2003, 67). That is, the ontology of the person always includes a reference to the 
other. For the sake of argument, I will focus only on the philosophy of the individual 
mind.
Stein’s affective spectrum comprehends feeling sensations, general feelings, 
moods, emotions, and sentiments. In line with Scheler and Pfänder, she claims that 
each one of these phenomena constitutes a stratum of depth of the personality, 
where the bodily sensations constitute the more superficial strata and the sentiments 
the more central ones. In what follows, I present Stein’s taxonomy of the affective 
realm.
 (a) Feeling sensations (also called sensations of feelings and sensual feelings). The 
first class of affective states is constituted by the bodily sensations of pleasure 
and pain, which are localizable in concrete parts of the body. They are “affective 
phenomena” because we feel attracted or repulsed by the objects that arouse 
them. Following Stumpf and Husserl’s criticism of Brentano and in line with 
Scheler, Stein considers them to be sensations and not “intentional feelings” 
(Stein 1989, 100; Stein 2000, 163). Pleasure and pain are, thus, not intentional, 
despite being directed towards the objects that cause them. This causal relation, 
however, does not reveal an essential link between the affective state and its 
object.
 (b) General Feelings. These affect the total condition of the body and cannot be 
localized in a concrete part of it. Feeling tired, alive, alert, or irritable are 
12 Cf. For an overview: Reicher 2009, 122–123 and Vendrell Ferran 2013, 75–85.
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instances of general feelings, according to Stein (Stein 2000, 19). A similar 
claim was also developed by Max Scheler, who names such feelings “vital feel-
ings” or “feelings of the lived body” (Scheler 1973a, b, 330). Such feelings 
manifest a momentary status of the subject and reveal its “lifepower”. They 
show a phenomenal dimension that is unique for each of them. This uniqueness, 
however, is not reflected in our languages, which are too poor to describe the 
diversity of qualitative aspects of our affectivity. Despite the fact that these feel-
ings are directed towards vital values, they are not responsible for apprehending 
them. They just indicate them.
Stein introduces a distinction within this class between “feelings of living” 
(“Lebensgefühle”) and “states of living” (“Lebenszustände”) (Stein 2000: 21). 
According to this distinction, it is possible for a state of living to emerge with-
out being felt, so that we do not have consciousness of the experience and, thus, 
it cannot be considered a feeling. We can be tired (a state of living) without 
feeling it (a feeling of living). It is also possible for a feeling of living to be 
given without being accompanied by the corresponding state of living. This is 
the case when I feel invigorated (a feeling of living) without the state of vigor 
really being given.
 (c) Moods. This class is constituted by phenomena like feeling cheerful or depressed 
that cannot be localized in any part of the body. Moods are a general state of the 
soul that is not necessarily body-bound. In Stein’s view, moods have objective 
correlates. Comparing them to emotions, she writes: “In joy the subject has 
something joyous facing him, in fright something frightening, in fear something 
threatening. Even moods have their objective correlate. For him who is cheer-
ful, the world is bathed in a rosy glow; for him who is depressed, bathed in 
black. And all this is co-given with acts of feeling as belonging to them” (1989, 
92). This passage suggests that emotions such as joy, as well as moods such as 
being cheerful, are intentionally directed towards the world. The intentional 
structure of both phenomena, however, is different. Emotions are directed 
towards values such as the joyous, the frightening, and the threatening, while 
moods can be characterized by a different kind of intentional reference. Moods 
constitute the background structure of our experience and are enduring affective 
states that influence and “colour” the way in which we are directed towards the 
world. This interpretation puts Stein in line with Husserl, who considers moods 
to be the emotive background of our experience. In Husserl’s view, moods are 
responsible for the world’s appearing to us in a certain light. They are not inten-
tional because they apprehend what is valuable, but because they build the 
background of our reference to the world.13 The intentionality of moods, thus, 
can be described as a “background” intentionality and as such substantially dif-
fers from the intentionality of the emotions which is directed towards values.
Moreover, Stein considers moods to be constituent elements of feelings. 
Emotions have, thus, “mood ingredients”. She observes that each feeling has a “cer-













































tain mood component that causes the feeling to be spread throughout the ‘I’ from 
the feeling’s place of origin and fill it up” (Stein 1989, 104). Given that they are the 
background which constitutes the intentional structure of the emotions, moods form 
part of the emotion itself. Accordingly, each feeling is characterized by a different 
mood component. Those feelings with weak mood components are more focused on 
their objects than those that have a strong mood component. Moods are responsible 
for the range of emotions we are able to experience and for the degree of focus on 
an object that each one of these emotions entails.
Furthermore, according to Stein, moods may function as dispositions to react. 
They are able to give direction to our thoughts, feelings, and actions. She writes: 
“And it’s a peculiarity of the feelings that they bequeath to the soul such trend- 
determined overall states […]. This lifted mood implies at the same time a ‘disposi-
tion’ to react in the sense of the original attitude, even where no adequate motive is 
given for such attitude” (Stein 2000, 217–218). This shows that it is not only beliefs 
or desires that may influence our actions, but also affective acts such as moods. The 
idea that affective phenomena may motivate actions can be found implicitly in 
Brentano’s claim that there is only a gradual difference between an emotion and an 
act of the will. Stein, however, in line with the modifications realized by the early 
phenomenologists, considers affective and conative acts as phenomena belonging to 
different classes, which are nevertheless able to influence each other.
These three claims, which are the kernel of Stein’s philosophy of moods, are 
relevant for contemporary philosophy in at least two respects. First, the current 
debate conceives of moods as having secondary importance in contrast with the 
primacy of emotions.14 On the contrary, Stein’s approach shows that the nature of 
the emotions cannot be fully understood without an account of the relation between 
emotions and moods. To shed light on the nature of moods implies a better under-
standing of our emotional responses, given that moods are constituent elements of 
them. Moreover, it has been common in contemporary debates to consider moods as 
lacking intentionality, in contrast to the emotions, or, in the same vein, to consider 
moods as “generalized emotions”.15 The Steinian account provides us with another 
image of this phenomenon: Moods are responsible for giving the world its signifi-
cance, and in constituting the background of our experience they are deeper than 
emotions. They show a “background” intentionality which is distinct from the direct 
intentionality of the emotions, but nevertheless it is a form of being directed towards 
the world.
 (d) Emotions—or as Stein calls them, “feelings in the pregnant sense of the word”— 
build the fourth class of affective phenomena (Stein 1989, 100). Sadness, hap-
piness, and aesthetic appreciation are instances of emotions. The phenomena 
belonging to this class may be characterized according to two features. On the 
one hand, they are felt in a specific way and show a phenomenal quality. On the 
14 Cf. for an exception to this view in the current debate: Ratcliffe 2013: 353. This author interprets 
some moods as existential feelings.
15 An exponent of such view is Solomon 1993: 15 and 71.









































other hand, they are intentionally directed towards the world and disclose val-
ues. In order to develop this last feature, consider the following example from 
Stein:
Suppose that while I am hearing a report, and thus while this objectivity, ‘report’, is devel-
oping for me into a series in the current of self-generating intellective acts, a joy at this 
report is beginning to fill me up. ‘Joy’, this unity of experience, is oriented towards some-
thing ‘external’ to the current. Indeed, it is joy ‘at’ the report, therefore an ‘act’. And some-
thing on the objective side corresponds to it: the joyousness of the report, which attaches to 
it by virtue of its positive value. (Stein 2000, 75)
This passage suggests that emotions have a twofold intentional reference. In the 
example, the emotion of joy is directed towards the report, but it is also directed 
towards an objective correlate—the joyousness—of the report. Both objects will, in 
what follows, be the objects of analysis.
Emotions are directed towards objects such as material items, animals, persons, 
and states of affairs. We may feel disgusted by an odor, fear a dog, envy our neigh-
bor, be afraid of a possible third world war, etc. To react emotionally to something 
requires that this something is given to us. Following the current terminology intro-
duced by Anthony Kenny, we can name these objects “material objects” (Kenny 
2003, 132). Embedded in the Brentanian and Husserlian tradition mentioned above, 
and in line with other phenomenologists such as Pfänder, Stein claims that these 
objects are given to us in “theoretical acts” (Stein 1989, 98). The material objects of 
the emotions are given to us thanks to cognitions, i.e. emotions have a founded 
nature. Stein writes that “it holds true of the “affective acts,” as it did of the logical 
acts, that they are of a founded nature, that they are stance-takings toward an alleg-
edly factual material, that they are ‘reactions’ of the subject to information of what-
ever kind which has been imparted to him” (Stein 2000, 157).16
Which are the “theoretical acts” in question? It would be a misreading of Stein’s 
position to claim that only judgments function as “theoretical acts”, because in her 
view different types of “cognitive” phenomena work as bases for the emotions.17 
Brentano claimed that emotions depend upon presentations or judgments; Husserl 
claims that intentional feelings refer to objects or situations that are given in found-
ing objectifying acts; and Pfänder claims that the basis of an emotion can be a per-
ception, an intuitive representation, or even a non-intuitive “thinking in something”. 
In Stein’s view, perceptions, imaginings, and deductive thoughts count chiefly as 
theoretical acts. With this claim, she is defending a cognitive account according to 
which emotions are based on cognitions and depend upon them. Her version of 
cognitivism takes a wide range of phenomena into account as intellectual bases for 
the emotions. This contrasts with some versions of cognitivism developed in the 
analytic debate in the last decades of the twentieth century, such as, for example, in 
16 A similar claim may be found in: Stein 1989, 101
17 Given that it is widely accepted by contemporary philosophers that emotions are based on cogni-
tions, i.e. that emotions have cognitive bases, I speak here of “cognitive phenomena” to interpret 










































the belief–desire theory of the emotions (Green 1992) or those authors that assimi-
late emotions to a special kind of judgment (Solomon 1993, 126; Nussbaum 2005, 
22). Stein’s broader cognitivism has advantages compared to these latter approaches. 
It is able to explain how those emotions that are not based on judgments, such as 
disgust in face of a perceived object or fear of something merely imagined or sup-
posed, are possible. It is also able to explain the emotions of those beings that do not 
possess sophisticated forms of cognition but nevertheless react emotionally. Recent 
developments of analytic philosophers go in a similar direction, avoiding an over- 
intellectualization of the affective life (Goldie 2000; Tappolet 2000).
Emotions are not only directed towards “material objects”, but also towards val-
ues. This claim was shared in one form or another by all the early phenomenolo-
gists. As in the example above, joy is directed towards the joyousness of the report. 
The joyousness is the intentional object of the emotion. To distinguish this kind of 
object from the “material objects” examined above, I will refer to them using 
Kenny’s widely accepted terminology and speak of “formal objects” (Kenny 2003, 
132). The formal object of an emotion is the evaluative category that is related to a 
material object. In the same sense that perceptions and judgments are objective acts 
that present an aspect of the world, emotions have their own intentionality, which 
consists in presenting values.
An interesting feature of the formal objects of the emotions is that they are 
restricted. Despite the fact that we may find different objects, situations, and states 
of affairs joyful, i.e. that joy may be directed towards different material objects, the 
emotion of joy is always related to the evaluative category of the joyfulness. In rela-
tion to these restricted objects, emotions may thus be appropriate or inappropriate. 
To feel joy with regard to something dangerous is inappropriate in the same sense 
that it is in appropriate to feel fear with regard to something joyful. From Brentano 
Stein inherits the idea that emotions are related to what is valuable. Stein, however, 
will develop her own version of the relationship between emotions and values. This 
version of the relationship will occupy me in the last section of this paper.
 (e) Sentiments. To this category belong gratitude, hatred, and love. The term “senti-
ment” (“Gesinnung”) used by Stein was coined by Pfänder in his Psychologie 
der Gesinnungen (1913/1916) and was also used by other phenomenologists 
such as Gerda Walther. According to Stein, sentiments belong to deep strata of 
the self and are directed towards the personal values of others (Stein 1989, 101). 
The intentional reference of sentiments is different to the intentional reference 
of the emotions. Sentiments are characterized by their ‘centrifugality’, i.e. they 
“stream” from the subject to the object, bridging the gap between both poles 
(Pfänder 1913, 362). Moreover, sentiments do not show a hedonic valence: For 
one who loves, this love may be felt in a painful way, and it is also possible for 
the hater to feel his hatred with pleasure. This constitutes a difference from the 
emotions, which oscillate between the poles of pleasure and pain: joy is always 
pleasant, disgust always unpleasant, etc.
We are now able to answer the two questions at the beginning of this section. 
First, not all affective phenomena are intentional: feeling sensations are a special 













































class of sensations and they do not show the feature of intentionality. Second, those 
affective phenomena considered at first sight as intentional show, on closer inspec-
tion, strong differences in their form of being directed towards values: general feel-
ings indicate values without apprehending them, emotions grasp values, moods 
show a background intentionality and sentiments aim for bridging the gap between 
subject and object.
Stein’s model of affectivity is embedded in the Brentanian tradition. She inherits 
from Brentano the main claims on the intentionality of the affective life, but she also 
takes into account the modifications of this claim developed by those authors 
belonging to the phenomenological circles, coming to the conclusion that those 
phenomena that we call affective belong to different classes and show different 
modes of intentional reference to the world. In the reminder of this paper I will 
focus on one of these classes—the emotions—and analyze their relationship to val-
ues in Stein’s philosophy of mind.
3  Axiological Phenomenology: Stein on the Disclosure 
of Values
3.1  Emotion and the Feeling of Value as Unified Phenomenon
How do emotions achieve their epistemic goal of grasping values? What is the 
nature of the disclosed values? Both questions—the epistemic and the ontologi-
cal—will be the objects of analysis in these last sections of the paper. Regarding the 
epistemic question about the cognitive function of the emotions, Stein’s analogy 
between feeling and perceiving is instructive: “It doesn’t see that—just as with per-
ception—a mental apprehension springs up on account of the egoic contents in their 
“function of manifestation” reveal to the subject the view into a new object world. 
This new object world, which unfolds before us as we feel, is the world of value” 
(Stein 2000: 158). On Stein’s view, in the same sense that perceiving makes acces-
sible the objects of the physical world such as colors and sounds, the act of feeling 
makes values accessible to us.18
The analogy between feeling and perceiving used to explain the apprehension of 
values thanks to affective acts was shared by all the early phenomenologists. 
Nevertheless, there are prima facie two different versions of this claim. One possi-
bility, defended by Scheler, Geiger, and Ortega y Gasset consists in distinguishing 
between “feeling” (“Fühlen”) as the phenomenon whose function is to disclose val-
ues, and “the feelings” (“Gefühle”) as those emotional responses that may arise 
once a value is grasped in an act of feeling (Scheler 1973a, 256; Geiger 1911, 141; 
Ortega y Gasset 1966, 325). The first of these phenomena—the feeling values—







































determines our access to the world so that each thinking and willing is conditioned 
by it. As Scheler claims: “Man, before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an 
ens amans” (1973b, 110–111). We first feel values and only afterwards perceive 
objects, think about them, and have emotions and volitions towards them.
An alternative possibility embraced by Stein, which in this point is in line with 
Husserl, consists in interpreting the act of feeling values and the feelings or emo-
tions aroused by these felt values as two sides of the same coin (Husserl 1992, 404). 
This claim can be found already in Stein’s dissertation when she writes:
People want to distinguish between ‘feeling’ (“Fühlen”) and ‘the feeling’ (“Gefühl”). I do 
not believe that these two designations indicate different kinds of experiences, but only dif-
ferent ‘directions’ of the same experience. Feeling is an experience when it gives us an 
object or else something about an object. The feeling of the same act when it appears to be 
originating out of the ‘I’ or unveiling a level of the ‘I’. (Stein 1989, 98–99)
In this quotation, she has Scheler in mind, despite of not mentioning him directly. In 
her later work Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities too, Stein defends the 
same position: “Under the heading of ‘feel’ or ‘feeling’ two different things are 
combined: for one, the acts in which we are confronted with values, with objects as 
value-endowed, as ‘goods’; and apart from that, the attitudes that these values evoke 
in us” (Stein 2000, 159).19 Like Scheler, Stein claims that values are grasped in an 
act of feeling. Unlike Scheler, she considers this act of feeling and the emotions 
aroused by them to be unified so that each time we grasp a value we also experience 
an emotion. Moreover, in her view there is not a primacy of feeling values over 
perceiving, thinking, and willing, as becomes clear in the following passage:
Every fully constituted object is simultaneously a value-object. Basically, the value-free 
world of mere things is an abstraction that’s suggested to us by the fact that we aren’t 
equally persuaded by all the intentions that can arise on the basis of available material, but 
rather alternate between different ‘orientations’. When oriented theoretically, we see mere 
things. When axiologically oriented we see values, and in particular, aesthetic, ethical, reli-
gious values, and so forth. (Stein 2000, 160)
According to this passage, the perception of values is not prior to the perception of 
things. Both are simultaneously given and it is only a question of our interest or 
orientation whether we “see” values or “see” things.
Stein’s idea that the act of feeling and the emotions (the aroused feelings) are two 
facets of the same phenomenon is very relevant. The claim that both appear to be 
unified brings her theory close to current positions that define emotions as percep-
tions of values (the best example of such as position can be found in Tappolet 2000). 
Nevertheless, the Steinian model keeps the distinction between the act (which 
grasps or “perceives” values) and the state of feeling (the emotions) open. Keeping 
the distinction open is important in order to explain those cases in which it is pos-
sible to grasp a value without having the corresponding emotion, i.e. without fully 
reacting to it emotionally. Those theories that assimilate emotions to perceptions of 
19 Also in: Stein 2000, 79










































values, on the contrary, have troubles explaining such cases.20 Stein divides such 
cases of “empty grasp” into the following three general types21:
 (a) Absolute lack of value feeling. It is possible to perceive an object without per-
ceiving its value. We can listen to a melody without appreciating its value. In 
these cases we are completely value-blind.
 (b) “Cold” value knowledge. It is also possible to perceive an object and know that 
this object has value because someone told us so or because we learnt it, but not 
because we feel it. We can notice the generosity of somebody and see this gen-
erosity as a motive for gratitude, but be unable to feel this gratitude vividly. We 
know about the value by the testimony of others or by socialization, but we 
remain “cold” about it, i.e. we are “empty inside” (Stein 2000, 161). Like the 
case mentioned before, this is also a case of value-blindness.
 (c) Partial value feeling. The last possibility consists in perceiving an object, par-
tially feeling its value, but being unable to fully feel it. We have an inner rela-
tionship to the value, but we are not inwardly filled up with it. We can perceive 
the beauty of a landscape and this perception requires a response from us. In 
this case: “Beauty […] insists that I inwardly open myself to it and let my inner 
self be determined by it” (Stein 2000, 159). If the response does not take place 
then the “beauty doesn’t entirely divulge itself to me. The intention inhering in 
the mere information remains unfulfilled” (Ibid.). This last case suggests that in 
the Steinian account it is possible to be aware of a value without feeling it fully. 
She summarizes this possibility as follows:
The egoic contents that belong to a complete value-experience are not available here. In 
spite of that, you can’t say that no inner relationship to the value exists. The missing con-
tents are represented by empty places, which are marked off as place-holders for the spe-
cific contents, bear within themselves an intention toward those contents and a ‘tendency’ 
toward fulfillment by them, and, by virtue of this place-holding, can serve as a basis of the 
corresponding value-intention. (Stein 2000, 162).
Despite the recognition of this possibility, in Stein’s view, to fully grasp a value 
we have to respond to it with a feeling, i.e. with an emotional reaction. Thus, feeling 
values and responding emotionally to them are normally presented together. This 
position differs substantially from the one defended by Scheler and other early phe-
nomenologists who defended the separation of feeling and the feelings as two dis-
tinct phenomena.
A further remark regarding Stein’s discussion of cases of “empty grasp” is neces-
sary in order to understand the context of her theory. The concept of value-blindness 
was one of the topics treated by Max Scheler in his book Formalism in Ethics and 
Non-formal Ethics of Values (Scheler 1973a, 193). It was also one of the main pre-
occupations of the phenomenological analysis regarding value developed by 
Dietrich von Hildebrand in Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis (1922), whose 
20 Cf. For objections against these theories: Mulligan 2004.











































publication coincides with Stein’s Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
(1922). Von Hildebrand distinguishes three forms of moral value blindness: a) total 
value blindness according to which one is unable to understand what is morally 
good and what is wrong; b) partial value blindness according to which one is able 
to understand some values (for instance, the value of good as well as the values of 
justice, loyalty and so on), but not other (like the values of humility, etc.); and c) 
subsumption value blindness, which concerns the blindness not of the value types, 
but rather of the bearers of values (von Hildebrand 1982, 44). Scheler’s and von 
Hildebrand’s discussion regarding the possibility of value blindness are motivated 
by value realism: values exist and it is possible that we are not aware of them. 
Stein’s considerations seem to be in line with these authors. This leads me to the 
final section of the paper.
3.2  Axiological Realism and Intentional Constitution
What is the nature of the grasped values? Stein’s position is not easy to place within 
the phenomenological axiological landscape. This last part of the paper attempts to 
give some insights about this question and to elaborate a very rough answer. Instead 
of discussing the virtues or shortcomings of her theory, I will offer in this section an 
interpretation of her account as embedded in the tradition of value realism. In my 
opinion, this aspect of her philosophy, that puts her in direct dialog with other early 
phenomenologists, has not been emphasized enough.
In phenomenology two main positions can be distinguished on the nature of 
values.22 On the one side, in later developments of this movement, authors such as 
Sartre or Merleau-Ponty defended the claim that values are created by the autonomy 
of the human being.23 On the other side, we find in early periods a wide spectrum of 
positions that fall under the label of “value realism” and try to develop Brentano’s 
fitting attitude theory of values in new directions, considering values to be the objec-
tive correlates of affective acts. Nevertheless, not all authors endorsed identical ver-
sions of axiological realism. Authors like Scheler defended robust versions of this 
doctrine, according to which values exist independently of the subjects who grasp 
them and the objects in which they are given. They consider the perception of values 
to be prior to the perception of their bearers and it is this value perception that deter-
mines our thinking and willing. In contrast, Husserl claimed that the subject has an 
active role in the disclosure of values. According to him, we first have access to the 
22 Cf. for an overview of different positions on value in phenomenology: Drummond 2002a, 8 and 
Drummond 2002b, 29.
23 In his insightful interpretation of Sartre, Strasser claims that Sartre’s account of the intentionality 
of the emotions, rather than being “correlativist”, is actually “dynamic” (Strasser 1977, 83–85). 
For Sartre, in other words, emotions are a magical transformation of the world, but not a form of 
apprehending values. Rather than being disclosive, the intentionality of the emotions in the 
Sartrean sense has to do with our world-shaping capacities. Thus, the idea of the appropriateness 
of the emotions is not one of Sartre’s central preoccupations


































objects that are given to us in cognitive acts such as perceptions or judgments, and 
then we may recognize a value in these objects, i.e. we experience them as valuable. 
Despite this active role of the subject, however, in Husserl’s theory “it remains true 
[…] that values are disclosed rather than created” (Drummond 2002a, 8).
According to my interpretation, Stein’s conception of values should be embed-
ded in the early phenomenological tradition of axiological realism.24 Three observa-
tions can be made in support of this claim.
 1. Vocabulary. In the Empathy book and in her Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities, Stein adopts the entire vocabulary of value realism. It is common in 
both works the use of expressions such as “grasping values” (Stein 2000, 159), 
“responding to values” (Stein 2000, 159), and “the “discovery” of values” (Stein 
2000, 220). This vocabulary suggests that values are disclosed, grasped, 
endorsed, or discovered by them. As mentioned above, in her view it is also pos-
sible that we are “value-blind”.
 2. Epistemology. As expounded in the last section, values are given to us in acts of 
feeling, which Stein conceives as emotional responses. If values require a 
response from feeling subjects, they cannot be created at will. Stein is not defend-
ing a creationist account of values: neither a position close to social constructiv-
ism, or a form of projectivism and subjectivism. Values are not creations, 
constructions, or projections of our feelings, they are entities that present to us 
with enough authority to demand a specific answer. The epistemology of values 
requires not only that we are “susceptible” to them, but also that we have enough 
“life power” to experience them, because responding to a value consumes psy-
chic energy (Stein 2000, 220). Values that belong to a higher hierarchy concern 
us more deeply and they require more energy to be grasped. And it is also pos-
sible that some values are accessible only to some individuals who are respon-
sible for discovering them and making them accessible to the community.
 3. Objectivity. According to Stein, values are no less objective than the data of the 
outer world (Stein 2000, 164). The clarification of this last point will take us to 
the core of the question about the ontological nature of value, and will allow us 
to develop the Steinian version of value realism. Despite being embedded in the 
tradition of axiological realism, Stein’s version of realism is closer to Husserl 
than to Scheler.25 Values, for Stein, are “constituted”. It is precisely this use of the 
concept of “constitution,” as terminus technicus inherited from Husserl, that 
plays a central role in explaining how values are objective, for Stein. How to 
interpret this constitution?
A first possibility—rejected by Stein—consists in seeing values as dependent on 
the objects in which they are given. In this case values would be constituted by the 
factual qualities of the material objects perceivable by the senses. Beauty would 
then emerge with respect to qualities of the objects that are perceived by the senses. 
24 In this point, my interpretation differs from Lebech, who claims that Stein’s theory of values 
cannot be interpreted as either value realism or subjectivism (Lebech 2010, 139).










































Stein notices, however, that this cannot be the case. First, the same object may be 
perceived by different individuals without them perceiving it as having the same 
value-qualities. Second, it is possible that values do come to givenness when extra- 
egoic data do not play any role. This is the case when we perceive the elegance of 
an argument or when we value a joyful pardon: in neither case are any objects per-
ceived by the senses. Stein concludes that value-qualities cannot be constituted by 
factual qualities of the objects. When they appear inseparable, this is because a 
value-constitution goes hand in hand with object-constitution.
According to Stein, the intuitive givenness of a thing is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for the apprehension of its value. As she states: “Rather, an 
inner condition of the subject must be added in order to render possible the acquisi-
tion of the value” (Stein 2000. 162). Given that values are not intrinsically depen-
dent on the objects by which they are given, the question arises whether they are 
dependent on egoic contents. In Stein’s view, egoic contents have a twofold consti-
tutive function: “One, they are the material on the basis of which values come to 
givenness for us. And two, they deliver up the stuff for the corresponding affective 
attitude” (Stein 2000, 160). For example, the feeling of delight provides the basis 
for the apprehension of the value of beauty of a color and founds my gladness about 
this value of beauty. Like Husserl, Stein acknowledges that the subject have an 
active role in the disclosure of values. The idea of the constitution of values means 
that valuing something always requires the activity of the “I” as a valuing 
subject.26
This activity of the “I” should not be interpreted as a creation of values by the 
subject, but as the place making it possible for value to come to givenness. According 
to the “a priori correlation between noesis and noema” formulated by Husserl, there 
is a correspondence between experiencing (perceiving, judging, feeling, etc.) and 
what is experienced (perceived, judged, felt, etc.). For the case of values, this means 
that there is a correlation between the valuing subject and what is valuable. The cor-
relation between subject and object allows phenomenological research to adopt two 
different directions of investigation. On the one hand, it is possible to focus on the 
given phenomena. As Moritz Geiger put it, in this case there is a “turn to the object” 
(Geiger 1933, 15). This way was mostly followed by early phenomenologists such 
as Scheler and Geiger. On the other hand, it is possible to prioritize the pole of the 
subject and consider consciousness in its constitutive dimension. This interpretation 
is associated with Husserl’s transcendental idealism, but its roots can already be 
traced in his Logical Investigations. Stein’s analysis should be placed in line with 
Husserl, because she explains the constitution of values by examining the valuating 
subject. At the same time, like other early phenomenologists, she is also interested 
in the pole of the object: in values themselves as objects of our experience. According 
to Stein’s view, which tries to combine both orientations (the turn to the object and 
the turn to the subject), the pole of the object—in this case the values—can only be 
explained regarding the constituting activity of the subject. Constitution, hence, has 
26 Cf. for an elucidation of the concept of constitution in Stein: Lebech 2004, 68 and 2009, 267; and 
in Husserl: Moran and Cohen 2012, 71.











































nothing to do with projection of affective states or creation of values, but with an 
analysis of the subject as the place that makes it possible for values to appear to us. 
It is the activity of the subject that confers upon values an intelligible structure.
Stein’s idea of an intentional constitution of values aims for an understanding of 
values examining the role of the subject as the space in which the values become 
possible. The idea of constitution implies that the valuing subject and the values 
themselves are related to one another, that there is a direction from the subject 
towards the object, and that in being directed the subject plays an active role: values 
are dependent on valuing persons and the emotional experiences they are able to 
arouse. This correlation between the valuing subject and values themselves is cen-
tral for understanding how the intentionality of the emotions works. Given that 
emotions are object-directed and that they disclose values, they have conditions of 
satisfaction. Valuing subjects constitute values but these values are not arbitrarily 
related to the subjects. That we constitute values implies that we identify them 
thanks to our emotional experience. Thus, there is a relationship between the “I” 
and the value that can be considered appropriate or not. Further, values are per-
ceived as higher or lower. Egoic contents may have different significances for the 
constitution of various realms of value. These different realms correspond to the 
different strata of the personality and each one is constitutive for a different realm 
of value (Stein 2000, 163).
To sum up: Stein’s axiological position should be understood as an original 
application of phenomenological research that runs in two directions. Given the 
object of study, namely values, we can say that Stein defends a peculiar form of 
value realism. Like Scheler, she admits the existence of a realm of values that can 
be grasped and discovered thanks to our feelings. Unlike Scheler, but in a sense that 
may also be found in Husserl, Stein thinks that the nature of these values can only 
be fully understood if we turn to the subject and examine it as the place that makes 
it possible for the values to be given to us in an intelligible way. This double per-
spective shows that she takes the phenomenological datum of a correlation between 
mind and world seriously. Her work can be seen as an attempt to develop a form of 
value realism within the phenomenological framework of the Husserlian a priori 
correlation.
4  Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I examined the Steinian model of the intentionality of the affective 
phenomena and focused on the case of the emotions. I embedded Stein’s work in the 
larger framework of the Brentanian tradition on intentionality and the modifications 
realized by his students in order to explain how our affective acts put us in contact 
with the world. Stein shared common ground with early phenomenologists in the 
idea that not all affective phenomena are directed towards their objects in the same 
way. Regarding the emotions, she develops an interesting account according to 











































disclosing them. Taking seriously Husserl’s idea of a priori correlation she adopts a 
realist position about values; these, however, can only be understood under an accu-
rate analysis of the subject. Her analysis reminds us that the objects of our experi-
ence cannot be fully understood without a simultaneous analysis of the experiencing 
subject. This paper was conceived as an attempt to shed light on Stein’s claims 
about the affective life, revitalize her insights, and present her as a philosopher of 
the emotions whose claims are able to deal with the highly topical matters that still 
dominate current philosophy of mind.27
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